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ABSTRACT:
Trajectory datasets are being generated in great volumes due to high levels of Global Positioning System (GPS) and Location-Based
Services (LBS) use. Such data are increasingly being collected for a variety of academic, industrial and recreational reasons, sometimes
together with other strands of personal data such as socio-demographic, social survey and other sensor data carried/worn by the person.
In such cases, not only are movement data of a person available but also data on potentially a wide variety of other personal and
household attributes. Making such person-level data available for analytics opens up the possibility of new directions in analysing,
studying and understanding human behaviour, which is typically not possible with GPS trajectory datasets alone. At the same time,
the GPS data should be released in a privacy-preserving way that takes into account the possibility of re-identification of individuals
from quasi-identifiers available from other data strands. De-identification in these strands may be risked due to uniquely identifiable
information on significant locations and other spatial behaviours and choices detected from GPS trajectories. Using a multimodal
dataset that includes a GPS archive from 358 individuals, and by considering a number of alternative privacy-enhancing approaches,
we look at the potential for privacy preservation when personally-identifiable data are available from multiple data strands, for the
specific purpose of data to be released for transport research.
1. INTRODUCTION
GPS movement data have stimulated a great deal of research and
development interest due to significant proliferation of mobile
devices worldwide leading to voluminous amounts of mobility
data that support smart location-based apps and Web 2.0 appli-
cations. Individual trajectory data have been increasingly col-
lected for recreational and academic purposes and the possibility
of linking an individual?s mobility data with additional sources
of information potentially leads to being able to identify the lo-
cations visited by the individual (Seidl et al., 2015). Privacy of
location also called geoprivacy or locational privacy is a person’s
right to protect his or her location information from disclosure, or
to determine the extent to which the data can be shared (Duckham
and Kulik, 2006; Cottrill and Thakuriah, 2015). Publishing and
exploring such data is essential to improve transportation services
and to better understand the dynamics of urban areas and regional
economies.
This paper is motivated by two main considerations regarding the
anonymisation of GPS trajectory data for publication. First, in the
case of mobility services, the private information possessed by a
traveler potentially comprises their identity, current location, ori-
gin and destination of travel, journey time, locational preferences
and so on, requiring locational privacy preserving solutions from
technological, legal, consumer-awareness building perspectives
(Thakuriah and Geers, 2013). Among technological solutions,
a topical approach utilised is to have privacy concepts built into
physical and software systems as well as business processes from
the ground up using Privacy Enhancing Technologies; however,
commonly used approaches utilise pseudonyms, location accu-
racy degradation using geographical and temporal masking or
cloaking, and various forms of encryption. However, the quality
of specific privacy preserving approaches are use-dependent; as
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GPS data are obtained from on-line and off-line sources, different
protection methods have to be designed for different purposes or
end uses.
Our first objective is to examine these “fit-for-purpose” issues
where different end uses require different levels of anonymisa-
tion and aggregation of the GPS trajectories. For example, for
transport planning purposes we would need information about
the movement on particular road network links; for the choice
modelling we would need detailed and accurate information on
the movements of individuals. We consider these two specific
end uses of GPS trajectory data in transport research, i.e., road
network-based analysis such as network models, and choice mod-
elling, and examine the performance of alternative anonymisa-
tion methods for preventing privacy loss of GPS locations. We
use a complex data source, the Integrated Multimedia City Data
(iMCD) which includes a GPS dataset, for this purpose.
We examine approaches such as obfuscation of point data (geo-
graphic masking techniques), or generalisation (KDE-based meth-
ods, road-link assignment). Our goal is to examine correlation
coefficients of spatial patterns between original and anonymised
data and to identify approaches with which spatial patterns can be
recreated as accurately as possible. To this end we use Pearsons
correlation analysis (with adjustments made to the road network
proximity and similarity between trips derived from GPS trajec-
tories) to investigate the correlation between spatial patterns dis-
covered from original and anonymised data.
The second consideration is that new challenges to privacy preser-
vation are introduced in data-rich environments when there is
linkage of information on the same individual from different data
sources. This would require a comprehensive approach to lo-
cational privacy preservation in GPS data. Such an approach
would require consideration of potentially multiple data strands
or datasets in anonymising GPS data, rather than determining pri-
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vacy preservation solutions based exclusively on the GPS data.
This problem arises due to the presence of “quasi-identifiers”
(e.g., age, gender, professional status, occupational category, size
of family, ethnicity) that may work together to uniquely re-identify
anonymised locations in GPS data such as home, work, places
with significant stays and other points of interest. We make a
preliminary effort in this paper to note when such issues may
arise. Specifically, we address privacy issues regarding the iden-
tification of individuals in GPS trajectory datasets when these
are linked to the external attributes obtained from social surveys
as simple removing uniquely identifying information (ID, name)
from the released data is not sufficient to prevent identification.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 re-
views existing anonymisation strategies, especially for the static
GPS movement datasets. Section 3 provides details on a case
study and the data used for this research. Section 4 shows the
proposed methodology used for GPS trajectories anonymisation
when the GPS data ought to be released to researchers together
with an associated social survey data. Section 5 discusses the
results and concludes the paper.
2. RELATADWORK
In the recent years anonymisation of GPS traces has attracted sig-
nificant attention due to the increasing use of location-aware de-
vices such as smartphones or GPS trackers. This led to enormous
increase in the volume of collected spatio-temporal data about
individuals (Goel et al., 2012). Several approaches have been
proposed to tackle the problem in a data publication perspective,
in off-line manner, while the majority have been designed in the
context of location-based services (Zheng and Zhou, 2011). Ac-
cording to Zheng and Zhou (2011), most of the privacy issues
related to the GPS trajectories are connected with two types of
LBS. These are either for collecting location data about the in-
dividuals (snapshots where the location information is accessed
only when a user accesses the service) or continuous location data
stream when a mobile user provides the location data. Privacy-
preserving techniques for LBS (on-line) can be categorised into
three groups:
• false locations
• space transformation
• spatial cloaking
The problem of location privacy has been well studied in the
context of location-based services (Rossi et al., 2015; Olumofin
and Tysowski, 2010; Gruteser and Grunwald, 2003; Ghinita and
Damiani, 2009; Damiani et al., 2010; Hwang et al., 2014; Ghinita
and Damiani, 2009; Ghinita, 2013; Jin et al., 2010), but mainly
with a focus on on-line, service-focused anonymity. In this paper,
we consider off-line and data-focused anonymity, as in the con-
text of data publishing. Privacy-preserving techniques for trajec-
tory publishing (off-line) vary from the ones for querying in LBS
and can be categorised either into two or three groups. Two clas-
sifications are presented below. First way of classifying anonymi-
sation methods suggested by Bonchi et al. (2011), divides these
methods into: motion-patterns based methods and location-based
methods. Where the first one investigates how potential attacker
can predict locations of individuals, based on their mobility pat-
terns, whereas the latter one aims to prevent from identifying
users’ sensitive locations (Abul et al., 2008; Monreale and An-
drienko, 2010; Andrienko and Andrienko, 2009). The second
classification looks at the methods from more technical point of
view where these methods are divided, based on the techniques
used to protect geoprivacy of the individuals:
• clustering-based (also called microaggregation)
• generalization- and grid-based (obfuscation methods: grid
masking, random perturbation (in so called geomasking) and
density based generalisation approaches)
• others such as suppression and condensation or space trans-
lation
Following the structure of the three groups of methods, related
to the anonymisation, we first briefly present some examples of
clustering-based methods. Then examples using generalisation
and grid-based approaches. The last two parts of the review,
concern examples of the suppression methods, and problems of
adding quasi-identifiers or additional datasets to the GPS traces
respectively.
The clustering-based approach utilizes the uncertainty of trajec-
tory data to group k located in the similar space trajectories within
the same time period to form so-called a k-anonymized aggregate
trajectory Abul et al. (2008, 2010). Their approach Never Walk
Alone - NWA defines an uncertain trajectory as a cylindrical vol-
ume with a defined radius, where two trajectories ale co-localised
(Euclidean distance between them is less then designed radius).
NWA anonymizes a given set of trajectories in three steps: pre-
processing, clustering, and space translation. The disadvantage
of this method is that it assumes that everything starts in the same
time so it is more problematic to implement it for the data, as
the trajectories certainly are from different time slots (Abul et
al., 2008). Huo et al. (2012) propose to depersonalize only loca-
tions on the trajectories of individuals instead of standard way of
anonymising a whole trajectory ( You Can Walk Alone (YCWA)).
The idea of YCWA, is to split trajectories into move, stay se-
quences and generalise each stop into a territory based on a gen-
erated split map. We would argue that the method presented by
Huo et al. (2012), seems to be the most advanced from the cluster-
ing methods for anonymization purposes. They treat all the stop
locations with an identical importance rather than weight them
based on the significance or sensitivity of a place for individuals.
We suggest to improve this part by using significant locations
only, rather than all the available stops. As stated in (Golle and
Partridge, 2009), the uniqueness of home and work pairs of loca-
tions can reveal the privacy of an individual - whereas unmasking
100 stops on the traffic lights during the journeys of an individual
would not affect the privacy-related issues and could improve the
dataset potentially released for transport studies.
There are various combination works that combine clustering meth-
ods with generalisation methods such as in the example presented
by Monreale and Andrienko (2010). In their method they provide
a very high level of privacy protection generalising the data to the
point that it can be suitable at only to some kinds of analysis.
In particular to analyse the flows between areas and to calculate
basic statistics of the visits to these areas.
The next group of methods defined as a generalisation-based cov-
ers obfuscation methods such as grid masking, random perturba-
tion (so-called geomasking) and also density based generalisation
approaches. Random perturbation approaches for GPS anonymi-
sation, are the ones which involve relocating the collected GPS
points to preserve privacy of data subjects while maintaining the
quality of data. There are various perturbation methods, listed
in Figure 1 and they are mainly used in health research (Shi, X.
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Figure 1: An example of geomasking methods, where the first
from the left is a random directional and fixed radius masking
way, the middle one is a random perturbation within a circle, and
the last one represents donut masking.
Alford-Teaster and Onega, 2009; Hoh et al., 2008; Hampton et
al., 2010; Seidl et al., 2015).
Armstrong et al. (1999) introduce geomasking called then geo-
graphic masking techniques as the techniques with a high poten-
tial to improve the resolution of data published while still protect-
ing privacy of individuals. Grid-masking is based on overlaying
a grid of cells over the GPS trajectory, so each point is either
snapped or transformed into a corresponding grid cell (Leitner
and Curtis, 2006; Krumm, 2007; Seidl et al., 2015).
Another generalisation-based method was presented by (Poulis
and Skiadopoulos, 2013) where they defined a sequence of loca-
tions as OID (quasi-identifier - as there is a double meaning of the
quasi-identifiers in this paper we will use for the sequence of lo-
cations just the abbreviation to avoid misunderstanding), where
they follow select-organize-anonymise paradigm to anonymise
the data. The methods accounting for the sequences of points
in many GPS trajectorie or individual ones are mainly based on
clustering algorithms (Terrovitis and Mamoulis, 2008; Yarovoy
et al., 2009). In generalisation-based methods there are mainly
approaches that are blind for the sequences in the movement data
(Nergiz et al., 2008; Monreale and Andrienko, 2010).
Suppression methods and space translation are usually used for
economic censuses, where data reported for an areal unit with
multiple establishments must be suppressed (confidential loca-
tions) to at least five locations when placed on maps (Leitner and
Curtis, 2006).
Often using additional external information may help to identify
individuals much easier than without this information. Having
said so, we do not think here about only the private information
about individuals but also just a standard GIS layer such as land
use or Point of Interest database. Thanks to which significant
places for individuals may reveal more individual’s characteris-
tics. Using data captured from the vehicles may show that fine-
grained location traces reveal speed distribution and acceleration
patterns that can be used to distinguish traces from different ve-
hicle types (e.g., trucks and cars). Analysis of Zan et al. (2013)
show that a type of a vehicle (car/van/track) can be identified with
the accuracy of 96%. The authors show that it is possible to iden-
tify outlier driving patterns such as higher speed, which could be
used to link anonymous segments of location traces and eventu-
ally recover complete trips. These examples shows the increased
risks for an identification when information not related to indi-
viduals but available publicly is taken into consideration.
Having summarized these methods, that have been used in past
to anonymise the static off-line GPS data, we have realised that
there is no real review showing the use of the anonymous data and
the extent of the lost information according to the purpose it may
be used for. Further worth of mentioning is the fact spotted by
(Nergiz et al., 2008) related to k-anonymity when sensitive infor-
mation is present, stating that k-anonymity does not necessarily
prevent the disclosure of the sensitive information. We provided
an overview of research effort concerning how to anonymise a
moving objects database. While only few papers have been pub-
lished so far on this problem, much large body of work has been
developed for location privacy in the on-line, dynamic context of
location based services.
3. DATA AND CASE STUDY
Our location data come from the integrated Multimedia City Data
(iMCD) project conducted in Glasgow by the Urban Big Data
Cetnre, University of Glasgow, UK. It is a project where the 2095
participants of 1505 households in the Greater Glasgow Area
took part in the social survey and 400 of them took part in the
sensor project where they were carrying a GPS tracker record-
ing locations every 5 seconds (TranSystem 747PorS) for a week.
Furthermore the participant who took part in the sensor project
were also asked to deliver an activity diary from the first full day
of the study, to collect the data that could be treated as a ground
truth in algorithms development.
Figure 2: Study area of the iMCD project covered Glasgow City
and six surrounding local authorities. The map presents the cov-
erage of the study with GPS footprints of 358 users from whom
we had obtained the valid data.
Our additional data come from the social behavioural survey for
the iMCD project. With this dataset we are able to add to the
GPS trajectories various attributes describing individuals based
on their responses to the survey’s questions. The specific aims of
the survey were to collect data on:
• family type, household income etc. to allow understanding
of the socio-economic background of the household;
• individual’s patterns of activity and mobility;
• values, attitudes and perceptions on a range of topics relat-
ing to behaviours and daily activity;
• education and learning
• informal competencies, like financial understanding, IT skills
etc.
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4. OUR APPROACH
Our line of research is about developing ad-hoc anonymisation
techniques for the intended use of the data: for instance, with
respect to a specific spatio-temporal analysis such as transport
planning. We explore various methods for GPS data anonymisa-
tion and try to explain how the social survey responses may affect
the privacy protection. Our main strength lies in anonymising,
mainly significant locations to leave the rest of the data for the
transportation planning purposes, traffic analysis etc. As stated
in (Bonchi et al., 2011), most of the anonymisation methods are
characterised with a huge of information loss once the data satisfy
some concept of anonymity.
From the questions asked in the survey questionnaire, in the dis-
cussed iMCD project, we identified questions which could be
used as the potential quasi-identifiers and increase the risk for
re-identification of the individuals. Questions such as: about de-
mographics, ethnicity or religious believes may not be disclosive
from the aggregated social survey itself, but if connected to the
GPS trajectories would reveal all the mobility behaviour of this
particular person. In the table below we present a set of quasi-
identifiers from the conducted social survey, which could affect
the privacy levels. We divide these identifiers into two groups:
spatial and non-spatial.
Table 1: Potential quasi-identifiers from the iMCD social survey.
Non-spatial
quasi-identifiers
Spatial quasi-identifiers
Ethnicity Kid’s schools names
Income Use of public transport
Language course Way of travel to work
Employment and support
allowance
Pet ownership
Sexual orientation Walking with pet
Job description
Disability
Further in this section, we provide the information on how to pro-
cess classify and anonymise GPS trajectories. First though we
would want to draw the attention of the reader, to possible risks
for divulging the privacy when releasing the data in conjunction
with a social survey. With the potential identifiers listed in Ta-
ble 1, few possible scenarios in which these variables could help
to re-identify the survey’s respondents, are presented. With the
detailed information about ethnicity (e.g.Irish, Gypsy / Traveller,
Polish, Bangladeshi or Scottish Caribbean) and the daily patterns
of these individuals uncovered from GPS trajectories (visiting for
example Polish grocery shops or the Polish Community house),
we could with a high probability identify a certain individual.
Furthermore the information about an evening language course,
sexual orientation or employment and support allowance, could
reveal certain individuals’ identity, if they have visited a foreign
language centre, a job centre or a gay club during the survey du-
ration (language courses could be on weekly bases, and to get a
job seeker allowance, a person needs to visit the centre at least
every two weeks). A particular job description, such as a driver
or a postal worker, when combined with the classified GPS trajec-
tories, may easily reveal the identity of an individual, as there are
ways of inferring from raw GPS traces some occupations, based
on the possible movement patterns. Moreover, declaring the dis-
ability in the survey may be detected from the traces when a po-
tential survey respondent uses, for example wheelchair ramps.
These are non-spatial potential quasi-identifiers which could in-
crease the risk of re-identification of the survey respondents. The
second group of identifiers is more related to the space as contains
information about particular locations. School locations may be
identified from GPS trajectories, therefore if a parent gives a lift
to a kid and leaves a GPS footprint which could help to re-identify
this particular respondent. Another good example would be a
question in which the respondents needed to declare whether they
have a pet and whether they regularly walk with it. If they do it
can be identified from the GPS trajectories and the person could
be identified.
According to Huo et al. (2012) collection and publication of peo-
ple’s everyday trajectories pose serious threats on people’s per-
sonal privacy. Collecting these GPS traces with a social survey
increases the disclosure process significantly. There are many
questions that reveal individuals privacy when combined with
GPS trajectories therefore we suggest excluding from GPS tra-
jectories stop locations that are not classified as significant but
cover sensitive locations such as a nursery, school or church.
To proceed with the anonymisation process we first processed
GPS movement data using the algorithms developed by Sila-Nowicka
et al. (2015).
• GPS processing
• Identification of significant locations
• Spatial cloaking of significant locations - various ways to
prevent identification based on the built environment
The data were classified into adequate travel modes and the trip
purposes were detected and classified as individuals home and
significant locations need to be anonymised to protect the privacy
of an individual. The main advantage of our work that we account
for the significance of the stay points where they are important
and more sensitive than ordinary location samples. As mentioned
above, we divide our methods according to the purpose they may
be used for. If used for transport planning purposes, we suggest
using either the first method (spatial cloaking) we describe or the
third (GPS road link counts). For urban planning purposes we can
use all the possible methods that preserve the information about
densities and spatial patterns. For spatial choice modelling where
the most detailed and restrictive data would be required we would
suggest to provide instead of location, trip chaining dataset with
attributes defining the surrounding in a geographical and socio-
demographical way.
We first propose to use one of the geomasking methods. As we
are restrained to a road network, we delete significant locations
from the GPS trajectories, instead of changing and randomly as-
signing the location. Therefore, we obtain a new dataset in which
all the movements are presented as the raw (or classified into
travel modes and activity locations) data and just the network-
based area around the significant locations is obfuscated. The
classified data are presented on Figure 3 and the the geomasked
dataset is presented in Figure 4.
In the next step we generalised GPS trajectories using Kernel
Density Estimation method. This way we show the spatial pattern
of individuals, rather than reveal their full set of GPS locations.
The KDE map is constructed based on the anonymised trajectory
from Figure 3. To investigate how accurate the spatial pattern
of the data is preserved, we calculate Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficients between unmasked and masked data. For the classified
GPS trajectories we calculate separate coefficients for all the de-
rived from raw GPS data, segments with classified travel modes
and the results are listed in Table 2.
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Figure 3: Classified GPS trajectory of an individual who carried
a GPS tracker for a week.
Figure 4: Spatial cloaking - GPS points inside the boundary cre-
ated from 300-500 meters road network area around the signifi-
cant locations (plus possible connection to the main road) to pre-
serve privacy.
Figure 5: Trajectory generalisation - KDE for line segments de-
rived from GPS trjectories. Kernel bandwidth 100m for the cell
50m. This example is derived from the anonymised GPS trace
where all the significant locations were cloaked.
To increase the privacy protection we could use KDE to gener-
alise the previously cloaked GPS trajectories. An example is pre-
sented in Figure 5.
Different Kernel bandwidths may result in the different anonymi-
sation effects. The bigger the bandwith, the less unique locations
can be identified. The example of these two approaches is pre-
sented in Figure 6 and Figure 7. In comparison to 6, Figure 5
shows, how cloaking the significant locations increases the visual
importance of other locations in individuals’ daily routines.
The next approach uses GPS trajectories to assign them to the
nearest road links, after they have been map-matched. This method
is similar to the one presented by Lin et al. (2009), where they re-
place specific locations with a road ID, moving object ID and
the direction. Presentation like is sufficient to derive trajectories
or traffic flow information. In our case we first cloaked all the
Table 2: Pearson’s correlation coefficients for various travel
modes. The results are based on the sample of 5 individuals.
Segments of GPS
trajectories classified into
travel modes
Pearson’s correlation
coefficient
Driving 0.942
Walking 0.852
Bus 0.938
Train 1.000
Stops 0.954
Traffic stops 0.982
Home 0.000
Significant places 0.000
Figure 6: Trajectory generalisation - KDE for line segments de-
rived from GPS trjectories. Kernel bandwidth 100m for the cell
50m. Trajectory without anonymised significant locations.
Figure 7: Trajectory generalisation - KDE for line segments de-
rived from GPS trajectories. Kernel bandwidth 300m and the cell
100m. Similarly to the Figure above, this generalisation is pre-
pared from the raw dataset for one individual user, therefore sig-
nificant locations which were not eliminated can be identified.
The resolution of the map may preserve from identification of
these places, nevertheless in our opinion they should be removed
before.
sensitive locations. Then, to prevent from the re-identification
of individuals we publish only values for the road-links where,
more than two separate users conducted a trip. Figure 8 presents
the classified GPS-based movement segments into travel modes
and stops. These segments are being map matched to the road
segments and then counted. Furthermore information such as
speed, movement direction or the average number of stops or traf-
fic stops can be counted and assigned to the road-link (see Figure
9).
The newly created dataset, such as this one, can be used for trans-
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portation planning purposes without revealing any substantial pri-
vate information. The dataset can be created at different levels of
aggregation: an aggregated level where we do have only informa-
tion on the travel counts per road link with a direction attribute;
and a disaggregated structure. The latter option provides the in-
formation of individuals passing through particular road links at
certain times of a day. This method requires though proper spa-
tial cloaking and not revealing the road links where there was
only one person on the road.
Figure 8: Classified GPS trajectories.
Figure 9: Road link generalisation.
Another discussed approach covers grid-masking algorithm where
we show the potential of this method for anonymisation purposes.
Authors such as Leitner and Curtis (2006) conclude that there is
a threshold cell size, for both privacy and masking, above which
larger cell sizes cause the unmasked pattern to be perceived dif-
ferently. According to Seidl et al. (2015) the best solution would
be using a cell size of 30 meters to keep the highest amount of in-
formation about human movements. Such a small grid cell could
though affect the privacy reliability, therefore usually the cells
should be bigger. Shi et al. (2015) and Seidl et al. (2015) anal-
ysed the Pearson’s correlation coefficients, to detect the similari-
ties in spatial patterns between unmasked and masked trajectory
data. They suggested that using a size of a cell equal 100 me-
ters, gives sufficiently good results for anonymisation of the GPS
data and preservation of the spatial pattern. We tested the method
for our dataset and got similar results. The results from testing
the Pearon’s correlation coefficients are presented in 3. To cal-
culate the correlations we followed a method presented by Seidl
et al. (2015), and calculated the difference between un-masked
and masked trajectories. The high correlation coefficient shows
the high level of preserved spatial pattern in comparison to the
unmasked data. Additionally Leitner and Curtis (2006) noticed,
there is a threshold cell size for both privacy and masking, above
which larger cell sizes cause the unmasked pattern to be perceived
differently.
Table 3: Pearson’s correlation coefficients for various methods
and on different levels of the accuracy.
Method
Spatial Cloaking 0.954 0.521
Grid-based 0.812 0.417
The results from Table 3 are based on the Kernel density estima-
tions for two different cell sizes and bandwidths. As expected the
results with the smaller grid cells return higher coefficient values
signifying better spatial pattern representation.
Figure 10: Grid-based masking - points inside 250*250 m grid
cells are recalculated as centroids of the particular cells and the
new trajectories are derived.
Figure 11: Generalisation of grid-masked trajectories - KDE for
the trajectories derived using grid-based-masking.
The Figure 13 shows the grid-based masking algorithm results.
This method varies from the standard grid-based algorithms, as
there is no information about the movement preserved, only the
information about the individuals locations counted per particular
grid cell is stored. In case of a small grid cell the spatial cloaking
of significant locations is needed, in a bigger grid cell such as 300
- 500 meters there is rather no need for cloaking any information
from the trajectories.
5. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A successful method of GPS data anonynmisation should be the
one, which maximizes the the geoprivacy of individuals, allowing
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Figure 12: Generalisation of grid-masked trajectories - KDE for
the trajectories derived using grid-based-masking.
Figure 13: Generalisation of the GPS trajectories - points inside
the particular cell are counted and treated as the density of partic-
ular grid showing density of movements of individuals.
though on the preservation of spatial patterns of human move-
ment. The balance might be different though for different re-
search questions. In this paper we presented various methods
used in the literature along with the suggestions which meth-
ods could be used for different research questions. For transport
modelling, and transportation studies in general we can use ag-
gregated data which show the road attendance per hour, week or
any other assigned period of time. Another option for transporta-
tion researchers is to analyse GPS traces as raw as possible, to
be able to identify small variations in speed or acceleration to
detect or example traffic incidents. Therefore the method of spa-
tial cloaking where all the sensitive or significant locations from
an individual’s trajectory are eliminated and the rest of the data
is classified into travel modes, provides unprecedented and rich
dataset for transport studies.
We have claimed to be able to present a trade-off between the
data privacy and the resolution of the GPS-based movement data.
To this end, we provided a list of possible threats when using un-
usual quasi-identifiers from social surveys, in conjunction with
the anonymised GPS data. All the questions which can be asso-
ciated with spatial dimension can be treated as potentially dan-
gerous for the privacy preservation. As mentioned before, infor-
mation about the religion can have a spatial aspect. Therefore,
when we aim to release the dataset which combines both: so-
cial survey and GPS movement data, we need to pre-analyse it,
based on the questions we designed in the survey. In the UK
social survey’s results are usually published at the local author-
ity level, or at the lower resolution with the restricted access to
the data (i.e. research purposes only). This spatial resolution
satisfy the anonymisation for survey data but might not prevent
re-identification of particular individuals when we have access
to the both datasets. Releasing the survey data with anonymised
GPS data can be framed into a releasing framework:
• When realising the spatially cloaked trajectories, all the sig-
nificant or sensitive locations have to be eliminated from the
GPS trajectory;
• When realising the data, as the generalised rasters we ought
to eliminate sensitive locations as well, to prevent from pri-
vacy revealing issues;
• Using road links, as a method to release GPS movements
we need to cut road links when there is only one individual
moving along this particular road segment, or to cloak the fi-
nal bit of the trajectory when it reaches a significant location
(mainly home and work pairs)
• Grid masking (Figures 10-13) shows to be a valid method
for urban planning purposes where the attendance in places
is noted and the movement directions can be detected per
particular grid cell; depending on the grid cell size, cloaking
might be needed. If the cell size is 500 meters there would
be a need to probably eliminate only the most important lo-
cations for particular individuals instead of all the sensitive
locations that could create potential risk of divulging one’s
geoprivacy.
These are preliminary analysis and apart from the Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficients we need to incorporate in the study k - anonymity
concept to verify the presented results. This study is exploratory
and investigates ’what if’ scenarios, in situations when the GPS
data are realised not only with simple quasi-identifiers such age
or gender but also the ones which are either spatially related or
more personal and may increase the identification of individuals.
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